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1.  Introduction 
 
The analysis of financial centers focuses mainly on the competition between and changing roles of the 
major places. In the European context thus usually London, Paris, Frankfurt/Main and other national 
financial centers have become objects of investigation (see Dietl et al. 1999; Grote et al. 2000; 
Laulajainen 2001 or Lo and Schamp 2001).  
The findings show that the recent reorganisation of financial centers in Europe under the conditions of 
-  widespread use of ICT with the possibility of remote access to exchanges,  
-  the development of innovative products on financial markets,  
-  and the advent of a single currency  
affects structures, organisation and specialization of the main actors within financial centers, i.e. banks 
and exchanges.  
Stock exchanges as important institutions of the financial system have lost their former position as 
„natural monopolies“, which was based on legal and territorial exclusivity. Increased competition 
between exchanges and new forms of cooperation are two sides of the same coin. The planned but 
failed merger between London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Börse AG in Frankfurt/Main in 2000 
and the merger of the exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels and Paris to Euronext in the same year are 
two prominent examples of this process. 
The following paper puts a focus on less prominent features of current restructuring, namely the roles 
and strategies of small German exchanges. Due to the federalist tradition of Germany six „regional 
exchanges“ exist beside the leading German bourse „Deutsche Börse“, originating from the stock 
exchange in Frankfurt/Main. The relationship between the different German stock exchanges has 
undergone changes in recent years, strengthening the position of the Frankfurt-based exchange in the 
international competition. The small exchanges have to redefine their positions in the course of this 
development. In order to analyze their options the general functions and possible roles of stock 
exchanges in the discourse of regional competitiveness is discussed first. These options can be 
described by the extreme positions of the role as regional financial institutions, collecting sensitive 
regional economic knowledge and thus forming part of the regional business environment and the role   2
as „footloose“ firms which compete in a despatialized market without regards to regional 
embeddedness.  
After exploring the general trends in stock exchanges the institutional change within German stock 
exchanges will be analysed. The look at actors and  strategies will show that the above sketched 
„regionalization option“ is found less frequently than the „specialization option“. 
 
 
2.  Stock Exchanges and the discourse of regional competitiveness 
 
Adapting the concept of competitiveness to the discussion of urban and regional development means 
to ask for the factors which make cities or regions „´perform´ better than others in so far as the income 
and employment generated within their boundaries exeed those of others“ (Begg 1999, 798). In 
criticism to such a simplistic view the discussion about sustainable regional development shows that 
income and employment are too simple as indicators for „successful“ regions. But regardless how the 
output is evaluated the key question remains: what are the reasons for the differences in the relative 
attractiveness of locations, which factors lead to competitive advantages of one region in relation to 
another? 
The research on „successful“ regions of the last decade has shown, that the development of a city, 
metropolitan area or a region is determined by various factors, which can roughly be distinguished into 
„economic“ – quantifiable - determinants (factors of production, infrastructure and similar) and 
„strategic“ – qualitative - determinants, which include policy factors and institutional design (Kresl 
1995). This differentiation pays tribute to the empirical findings, that the analysis of „hard“ potential 
factors such as the industrial structure, the accessibility by road or train or the quality of the labour 
force, is not sufficient in order to explain different paths of development.  „The more and more explicit 
coupling of economic performance with the existence of particular social institutions“ (Lorenzen 1999, 
5) characterizes the changing focus of economic geography and regional studies in the 90s.  
 
Fig. 1: The Urban/Regional competitive maze (Source: Begg 1999) 
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The schematic sketch of „the urban competitiveness maze“ by Begg (1999, 820) wants to illustrate 
theses different factors and their complex interrelations (Fig 1)
i. The four categories of the „input“ side 
– sectoral trends, company characteristics, the business environment and innovation and learning – are 
similar to those used by Porter to characterize „the competitive advantage of nations“ (1998).   
The first category captures the main influences from outside on economic activities in a city or region, 
acknowledging that the development of a specific city or region cannot be understood without detailed 
knowledge about the economic, political and social framework on a national and supra-national scale. 
The other three categories try to capture different dimensions of the specific location, each of them 
encompassing quantitative and qualitative factors required by regional actors to develop innovative 
strategies, institutions, or enterprises (Begg 1999, 802). Aspects off innovation capacities, different 
kinds of knowledge and institutional learning are important concepts within all three dimensions 
(Lorenzen 1999).  
The access to capital is one crucial factor for emerging or expanding industries which are the expected 
outcome of localized learning and innovation processes. They depend on the primary function of 
financial institutions: intermediation of capital by transformation of savings into investment.  The 
definition of venture capital already indicates that financing new industries cannot be explained by a 
simple model of capital allocating where the profit rates are highest. The key attributes of venture 
capital investment are: 
-  „long-term investment, requiring upt to 10 years for return, and 
-  involving potential equity participation for the venture capitalist, whose experience and 
specialized skills add value to the investment through participation“ (Thompson 1989, 67, see also 
Kulicke 1997 133f.). 
In his analysis of the „geography of venture capital“ Thompson points out, that a realistic model of 
venture capital should include „institutional networks, spatial constraints in day-to-day operations and 
decision making, personal contact histories and patterns, historically influenced investment 
philosophies and areal preference patterns“ (1989, 88). There are alternative financing options such as 
-  Public promotion/funding progammes 
-  Credit financing 
-  Business Investment Capital, which itself can be differentiated into: 
-  Public companies (large companies, listed and traded on stock exchanges) 
-  Private companies (limited partnerships for investing in venture situations) 
-  Bank-related companies (companies sets up to allow banks to circumvent laws about owning 
small businesses) 
-  Large corporate venture companies (venture capital subsidiaries of major corporations) 
-  Special start up-schemes at exchanges and 
-  Informal investors ( so called „Business Angels“).   4
Which form of financing is prefered depends on the economic history of countries and on 
contemporary regulations. But regardless which option of finance is followed in a special region, the 
mentioned studies show that the information- and contact-intensive process of raising venture capital 
is nothing less than a despatialized process requiring anonymous capital, but is on the contrary 
extremely dependent on informal /tacit knowledge about the circumstances of investment. Therefore 
the financial institutions of a region can be considered as integral parts of local or regional „social 
structures of innovation“ (Florida and Kenney 1988). Looking at the small German Stock Exchanges 
the question of regional embedding will be an important one. But before the detailed look at the 
German exchanges a general description of institutional change in the financial sphere is presented. 
 
 
3.  Stock Exchanges: Institutional change and competition  
 
In Germany the traditional way of financing business is by bank credits, whereas in the anglo-
american sphere the emission of equities is a far more important source of business financing. The 
German financial system is therefore called „bank-„ or „credit-oriented“, the anglo-american systems 
are described as „exchange-„ or „market-oriented“. Banks and exchanges are alternative institutions 
which can perform the sketched primary function of financial systems – transforming savings into 
investment. But their function for the primary capital circulation describes the contemporary situation 
of financial institutions only partly. 
Stock exchanges as institutions of the financial sector have experienced profound changes during the 
last decades. Trends as securitization, deregulation, automatization and de-spatialization all had effects 
on the size, number and organization of stock exchanges.  
Securitization – the tendency to move finance capital not by credit but by „securities“ of different and 
more and more sophisticated kinds – has increased the turnover at stock exchanges on a global scale. 
Financial transactions to a large extent have lost their direct relation to the producing sphere, a 
secondary capital  circulation – largely independent from the „real sector“ - has an increasing 
importance for the economy (Krätke 1995, 117ff.).  
Deregulation has facilitated the access of foreigners to exchanges all over the globe. Whereas some 
decades ago trading at exchanges was usually limited to a privileged, exclusive club of domestic 
members, exchanges today compete for new participants. Finance capital has thus increased its 
mobility tremendously.  
Automatization has helped to standardize products of exchanges, making rather complex things as 
financial futures comparable and negotiable. The development in information and communications 
technology eventually is responsible for de-spatialization, which has changed stock exchanges in a 
rather fundamental way. The whole idea of exchanges was about making people trade in a fixed 
location under conditions which are controlled by public bodies (as in continental Europe) or   5
institutions based on mutual agreements (as in Great Britain or the United States). Meanwhile the 
physical presence of trade partners (or their intermediaries) is no longer necessary as business is made 
through computer-based trading systems. The exchange floor has lost it´s importance almost 
completely. Some of the most important exchanges, as the NASDAQ or EUREX, the Swiss-German 
financial futures exchange, only exist virtually, as computer system. Remote access to exchanges – the 
possibility to trade in a computer-based exchange from a terminal situated anywhere in the world – is 
possible at nearly all important exchanges.  
This has two main consequences: The first is about the competition between the exchanges – which 
can be better understood when exchanges are viewed as firms. The second is about new competitors, 
the so called „Automated Trading Systems“ (ATS, such as Tradepoint, Jiway or Knight Trading)  
which offer nearly the same services as stock exchanges.  
„Normally an exchange is thought to be an organized market of securities“ (Di Noia 1998, 10). This 
definition has ist origin in the history of exchanges, where especially the aspect of authorized 
regulations of the market was important. This aspect of regulation even today distinguishes exchanges, 
even if they are organized by private companies, from other ATS which have developed as serious 
competitors to exchanges. But until some decades ago (in Germany only about 15 years) exchanges 
were legal monopolists due to different currencies and strict regulations which required 
personal/physical presence in order to trade at an exchange. 
This situation has changed completely, so Di Noia (1998, 11ff.) argues that today it is more adequate 
to think of exchanges as firms which offer different kinds of services – listing, trading, settlement and 
price information services. These corporations compete „with other firms and (are) forced to produce 
the best price-quantity-quality combination feasible“ (ibid, 13). The special feature of stock exchange 
is the safety standard offered by the required qualifications for membership either as listed firm or as 
trader on the exchange. Automated trading systems free-ride on the quality of information provided, as 
the usually trade in securities listed at one of the big exchanges. 
The customers of exchanges can be devided into two groups – direct and indirect customers. The two 
main groups of direct purchasers of the exchanges´ services are the issuers of securities who pay fees 
in order to be listed on an exchange and financial intermediaries who pay in order to be admitted to 
trading
ii. Indirect customers are all individuals, institutional investors or  other financial intermediaries 
that want to trade in securities and therefore send orders to admitted traders to be executed on an 
exchange. These customers can either choose the intermediary through which to trade or the exchange 
where to trade.  
The main factor which determines the choice of an exchange for investors and their intermediaries is 
liquidity, the total turnover in their requested securities. This is true for firms going public and 
interemediaries or direct traders on exchanges, as „bluntly, liquidity attracts liquidity“ (Di Noia 1998, 
20). Other factors as transaction costs, security, functionality and stability of the computer system or 
the regulatory framework and its supervision are comparably irrelevant. This is the main reason for the   6
different forms of cooperation, mergers and implicit mergers which have lead to a concentration 
process in stock exchanges in the last years. „An implicit merger between two exchanges consists of 
an agreement such that the set of securities, originally listed in one exchange, is listed by the other 
exchange and remote access is offered to the traders of each exchange, with reciprocity and without 
further requirements“ (DiNoia 1998, 21f.). These agreements increase liquidity on both exchanges and 
make the choice of an exchange easier for firms looking for a place to be listed and for intermediaries 
looking for a place to trade on.   
There is a lot of literature on the emerging global financial system and the specializations of different 
nodes in this system . On the global level the development of a system of globally important markets, 
which are based in New York, London, Tokyo has been analyzed by Sassen (1991). But one of the 
most liquid exchanges is NASDAQ – a completely computerized, „de-spatialized“ stock exchange. 
The markets for financial futures are nearly fully computerized as well. This system of globally 
important financial centres is backed by a number of smaller exchanges in the need of finding their 
position in the changing framework. The European exchange scene – after two decades of intensified 
financial integration – is characterized by overcapacities, requiring consolidation (Laulajainen 2001). 
London has long been the dominating European exchange, challenged in recent years by Frankfurt. 
Paris has increased itst position after the merger with Amsterdam and Brussels. So the position of the 
leading exchange on the European continent is still under competition (Dietl et al 1999, Grote et al. 
2000, Franke 2002). 
This situation is the context where the possible position of „regional stock exchanges“ will be 
discussed. As an understanding of the overall situation in Germany is necessary, a general overview of 
the financial system in Germany in the last decades will be given in the next part. 
 
 
4.  Development of German Stock Exchanges: Frankfurt and the rest 
 
As mentioned before the German financial system is often described as a „bank-“ or „credit“-oriented 
system  in contrast to the „market-„ or „exchange“-oriented systems of the United States or Great 
Britain (Hellwig 2000, 3). By these attributes is expressed, that the German business to a large extend 
is financed by bank credits, whereas in the two other mentioned countries enterprises tend to finance 
by the emission of equities. After World War II the financial system in the Federal Republic of 
Germany could be characterized for some decades by following aspects: 
-  after a phase of forced decentralisation directly after the war, the growing integration of West 
Germany into economic, political and military structures of the western world lead also to a 
recentralisation of financial institutions; 
-  a number of big banks, most of them with their headquarters in Frankfurt, dominated industrial 
financing, holding large shares of big industrial enterprises („Deutschland AG“);   7
-  commercial banking was (and still is) dominated by savings banks and credit (Genossenschaften), 
especially the savings banks and their central organizations are still protected politically as 
important instruments of regional policy; 
-  eight stock exchanges existed, located in the main economic centres (in alphabetical order: Berlin, 
Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Stuttgart, München). Some of these 
exchanges have a long tradition dating back to historical importance as merchant cities (e.g. 
Hamburg and Frankfurt founded in the 16
th century, Berlin and Bremen in the 17
th century).  
This structure has been the result of political decisions after World War II and longer historical trends. 
The political consensus on federalist structures is legally fixed, as – for example - the law on stock 
exchanges (Börsengesetz) makes sure, that there should be a regionally structured system of stock 
exchanges and their supervision. 
In spite of this federalist ideal, the Frankfurt exchange developed – because of the growing number of 
German and foreign banks and the proximity to the national bank – the Deutsche Bundesbank – better 
than the other exchanges and took over the leading role of the German exchanges from the end of the 
1950s. Grote (2000) distinguishes three stages of development after World War II. The first phase of 
reorganisation after the war (1945-1958) saw the main political and economic decisions for the leading 
role of Frankfurt (location of the central bank, recentralisation of the big banks, which had been 
devided directly after the war). The years from 1958 to 1973 are characterized by the consolidation of 
the national position of Frankfurt. Since the mid-70s – after the end of the Bretton Woods-System – 
the internationalisation of Frankfurts financial business is the main trend. 
This led to a growing market share of Frankfurt`s stock exchange. At the end of the 80s two thirds of 
total stock exchange turnover was counted in Frankfurt (von Metzler 1999, 299). Duesseldorf´s - the 
second biggest stock exchange in Germany. – share diminished from 35% in 1973 to 15% in 1988 
(Grote 2000, 19).  
The end of the 80s saw an intensified discussion on the future of the German financial system. The 
German financial market was considered overregulated and unable to respond to the challenges from 
outside as deregulation in many countries, the development of new financial instruments, 
internationalisation, and the increased use of information technology. „In a rare alliance, the domestic 
banks together with foreign banks – seeking entry into the German financial market – and the 
government that wanted to finance its own debt pressed for liberalisation of financial markets“ (Grote 
2000, 22). Therefore a number of legal and organizational reforms were launched in order to promote 
the German financial market. The main features of these reforms are listed in Table 1. They all 
contribute to the change of the German financial system to a more „exchange“ or capital market based 
system. This has led to tremendous increases in the number of listed companies at the exchanges and 
of share holdes. The market capitalisation in relation to the gross national product has also increased 
quite intensively in the last years, but lies with 67,6% in 2000 still under the average of the EC 
countries of 108,1%.   8
Table 1 : Financial Market Promotion in Germany – Federal initiatives and organisational reforms 
1986-2001 
1986  Reorganisation of the „Working Group of German Stock Exchanges“ with residence in 
Frankfurt 
1988  17 domestic banks form a holding society for the German Financial Futures Exchange 
1989 -  Reform of Stock Exchange Law: regulatory preconditions for trade in financial futures 
and electronic exchanges 
-  Interbank Information System IBIS is implemented (extension to an automated trading 
system is projected) 
1990 -  Five regional clearing associations merge into the limited company Deutsche 
Kassenverein AG, Frankfurt 
-  Trading hours of all exchanges are extende to three hours per day 
-  German Financial Futures Exchange (Deutsche Terminbörse DTB) takes up business 
-  Reorganisation of Frankfurt Stock Exchange: shares of new limited company 
Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse AG (FWB) are held by domestic (79%) and foreign (10%) 
banks and brokers (11%) 
1991 -  Tax on exchange turnovers i abolished 
-  IBIS takes up business as electronic trading system fully integrated into FWB 
-  Market share of Frankfurt Stock Exchange on domestic market: 70,4% 
1992  German exchanges except FWB join in Deutsche Börsenbeteiligungsgesellschaft mbH  
(DBBG) in preparation for the reorganisation in 1993 
1993  Reorganisation: Deutsche Börse AG is founded as holding for FWB AG, DTB AG, 
Deutsche Kassenverein AG. Shares held by: German Banks (70%, but none more than 
15%); Foreign Banks (10%), Brokers (10%); DBBG (10%) 
1995 -  Reorganisation of Stock Exchange Supervision: Federal Office for Securities Trade in 
Frankfurt 
-  Deutsche Kassenverein AG is integrated into Deutsche Börse AG 
1997 -  Introduction of New Market at FWB  
-  Electronic Trading System XETRA is implemented (trade in equities only) 
1998 -  Merger between DTB and Swiss Financial Futures Exchange: Eurex 
-  XETRA trade in bonds starts; 66% of all equities turnover is already in XETRA 
1999  Merger of the stock exchanges in Hamburg and Hannover 
2000 -  Trading hours are extended: 9 a.m. to 8 p.m. by initiative of the small exchanges 
-  Trade at exchanges at special German holidays is promoted by Deutsche Börse AG 
2001  Deutsche Börse AG goes public, thus changing the ownership structure (Deutsche 
Börsenbeteiligungsgesellschaft reduces to 7,5%) 
Sources: Frankfurter Finanzmarktbericht, different editions from 1991 to 2001; Deutsche Börse AG 
1994; Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse 2000   9
Representatives of non-Frankfurt stock exchanges and politicians of the „Länder“ were from the 
beginning rather critical about this policy of „financial market promotion“, fearing that promotion of 
the „German“ financial market would result in promoting the already most important institutions in 
Frankfurt.  
This fear is not unfounded, as the promoters of the reforms, especially representatives of the Frankfurt 
stock exchange and big banks, but also a former president of the Bundesbank, expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the fragmented structures of the German financial market rather openly (Bördlein 
1993, 200ff.). As long as the eight stock exchanges worked together in the above mentioned ADW, 
there was always an attempt to sketch a division of labour between one leading international stock 
exchange and independent „regional exchanges“. The small German exchanges hold a share of 7,5% 
of the Frankfurt-based Deutsche Börse AG formed in 1992/1993, which already shows by its name the 
claim as outstanding stock exchange in Germany. An action group „Finanzplatz e.V.“ promotes the 
„Finanzplatz Deutschland“ with the slogan „The Natural Choice“. Looking at the publications of this 
initiative one gets another impression, as they promote Frankfurt Stock Exchange as highly innovative 
and dynamic exchange, the other exchanges are not even mentioned by name. Already in 1994 a 
strategy paper of the Deutsche Börse AG made sure that the management in Frankfurt does not see a 
need for independent regional exchanges.   
The strategies resulting from this claim are not surprising, as the following example shows: When the 
electronic trading system XETRA was launched, the managers of the Frankfurt exchange wanted to 
offer the access to this system exclusively. Only by intervention of „Länder“ politicians the free access 
of the other exchanges to XETRA was fixed in the 3. Financial Market Promotion Law (3. FinFördG) 
1998. The Deutsche Börse AG criticized this additional paragraph to the 3. FinFördG (FAZ  
12.02.1998).  
The main focus of Deutsche Börse AG is the international competition. The strategy of the recent 
management, backed by a board which is lead by representatives of the big banks, can be considered 
only partly successful. On the positive side the merger between the German financial futures exchange 
(DTB) and the Swiss Options and Financial Futures Exchange (SOFFEX) in 1997 to EUREX can be 
counted. EUREX is the leading exchange for financial futures. Not successful was the attempt of a 
merger with London Stock Exchange in 2000. This project was commented upon rather critical by 
independent experts in Great Britain and Germany, because the strategy and the division of labour 
between the long-time rivals was not made clear beforehand. The project failed officially because of 
the intervention of OM, a Swedish competitor.  
On a national scale the market share of the Frankfurt exchange has increased even further, mostly due 
to the turnover of XETRA. Figure 2 shows the market shares of XETRA (completely computer based, 
remote access possible), Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse (FWB, computer-supported trading floor) and 
the other German stock exchanges respectively. Adding the shares of XETRA and FWB, the share of 
Frankfurt lies distinctly over 80%, with significant differences between the instruments. The share of   10
XETRA is most important for domestic equities, with about 66% of all turnover. Especially the 
German „blue chips“, the equities of the big companies forming the DAX (German Equities Index), 
are traded by computer, the XETRA share reaches its highest score of 94%. NEMAX – the German 
New Market Index is also traded nearly completely in Frankfurt, leaving the „floor“ of Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange a share of about 30%, after 60% in XETRA. There is nearly no XETRA turnover in bonds 
or warrants, these are divided between Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the other exchanges. So we can 





















When we look the distribution of the shares of the different instruments traded at all German 
exchanges – equities, warrants and bonds – we see, that more than 60% of the total turnover is 
achieved by domestic equities (Fig. 3). The second largest turnover is derived by trading of bonds 
(about 25%). Foreign equities with about 8% and warrants with only about 2% are comparably 
insignificant. Differentiating between XETRA, Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the other exchanges 
shows remarkable differences. Xetra is nearly totally used for trading domestic equities, with only a 
small share of foreign papers. Frankfurt Stock Exchange is important for domestic equities and 
domestic and foreign bonds. The other exchanges are obviously specialized in warrants and bonds, 
where the shares are distinctly over the average of all exchanges.  
The following chapter is going to differentiate between the different small exchanges.   11

















5.  Institutional Change, Strategies and Conflicts: The Minor Exchanges 
 
After looking at the overall development of financial markets on a global and national scale the 
following section will focus on the strategies of the competitors on a national scale. Considering this 
question one must recall that this is a topic which is intensively connected with the discussion about 
federal structures at all. So all economic considerations are closely intertwined with the continuing 
struggles between the federal and the Länder level over influence in the political system of Germany. 
The proponents of a strong federal level usually argue with the necessity to strengthen coherent 
national structures in the international competition. Decentralized structures bear the risk of 
inefficiency (f.e. long and intransparent decision processes, no definite competences a.s.f.), escpecially 
compared with centralized structures. Their opponents refer to the greater flexibility and adaptabilty of 
decentralised forms of organization – and of course to the constitutional structure of Germany, which 
postulates a subsidiary system. Therefore any decision on the organisation of stock exchanges does not 
only reflect considerations about economic necessities but also the wish of Länder politicians not to 
loose prestigious institutions. 
 
Looking for a place for the small exchanges means to consider the different factors which have been 
discussed as important for exchanges in competition (Section 3). Oehler (2000) presents three possible 
scenarios for smaller, regional exchanges in relation to a much bigger, dominant exchange.  
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-  Scenario A: Small exchange as branch office or Self Service Center of a central stock exchange 
This scenario is characterized by a rigid vertical hierarchy between the centre and its branches. 
Centralized coordination and control will be essential to such a structure, as well as one commonly 
used, centrally developed information-, routing-, pricing and settlement system. The advantages of 
such a system are especially on the cost side of the exchange. 
-  Scenario B: Small exchange as self-reliant franchise branch of a central stock exchange 
The position of the small exchanges in this scenario is stronger than in scenario A as they can still act 
as independent units, for example develop their own information system. Partly compatible would be 
product and price systems and only routing and settlement will be centralized. Typical for franchise 
systems is the definition of standardized components by the developer of the franchise concept which 
define the characteristics of the brand, leaving the risk with the counterpart.  
-  Scenario C: Small exchanges as self-reliant multi specialists in cooperation with a central 
exchange  
This scenario views small exchanges as highly specialized independent enterprises, creating their own 
products and „brands“. In spite of their independent positioning in a highly competitive market they 
may – in order to optimize compatibility with other systems and to minimize costs – cooperate with 
each other and the big exchange in development, implementation and maintenance of technical 
components.  
To Oehler (2000) the regional orientation of the specialized small exchange is a logical complement to 
the global orientation of the dominant exchange. This means backward integration of services for 
private investors on the one hand, coaching of potential listings on the other hand.   
 
As pointed out before, the small German exchanges are all institutions with a long tradition, supported 
by the politicians of their respective „land“. Being integrated in a central German exchange, with 
decisions made in Frankfurt seems to be no attractive option whatsoever. Looking at the strategies of 
the seven German exchanges beside Frankfurt, we find therefore mostly characteristics of scenario C, 
with one remarkable difference – the omission of the regional option. 
 
The following analysis of the strategies, institutional and organizational arrangements of these 
exchanges is based on the examination of annual reports and public relations material of the firms 
themselves as well as on commentaries in newspapers, weeklies or scientific literature.  
 
Finding differentiated comparable data for all exchanges is rather difficult, as each institution chooses 
to present the statistic which illuminates their individual strengths best
iii. It is therefore rather difficult 
to rank the exchanges according to size. Following their own descriptions, there are at least two 
second largest German exchanges (Stuttgart, Duesseldorf) and two third largest places (Berlin, 
Munich).    13
Looking at the total turnover of the official statistic, we find Duesseldorf with 283 billion Euro second 
after the two Frankfurt based exchanges XETRA (1969 billion Euro) and Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
(1824 billion Euro), followed by Stuttgart with 241 billion Euro. Stuttgart is second after Frankfurt 
according to the orderbook statistics. The other exchanges are still significantly smaller than 
Duesseldorf and Stuttgart.  
 
Drawing on the considerations about the competitions between stock exchanges, the overall situation 
is characterized adequately by the following statement from the annual report of the Duesseldorf 
exchange: „In today´s competition an exchange can only maintain its position by offering additional 
trading advantages and services. All exchanges trade the same securities at the same time under the 
same conditions“ (Börse Düsseldorf 2001, 7). 
So all of the small exchanges try to find business niches which are not attractive for the „big“ or 
„global“ players, especially for Frankfurt. Private investors and small and medium sized enterprises 
are correspondingly identified as these niches. 
The steps taken to make the individual exchange attractive for either of these target groups are rather 
similar (although the – always imaginative and always english - names of special arrangements differ). 
Typical schemes to attract private investors are: 
-  the extension of trading hours, (especially into the evening, when the well-to-do internet user is 
online); 
-  abolition of minimum trading units („best size guarantee“); 
-  opening of order books to private investors by Internet; 
-  access to special types of securities; 
-  information campaigns (for instance workshops or seminars for „stock exchange new comers“; 
exhibitions;  participation in spezialized trade fairs) ; 
-  guaranteed trading conditions: 
-  any order (or most of the orders) will be carried out in two minutes; 
-  if there is no matching offer/demand in the system, brokers will buy or sell the requested 
paper; 
-  best price is guaranteed (as we have seen, liquidity is one of the preconditions for good prices, 
therefore the smaller exchanges refer to more liquid exchanges, either the reference exchange 
is XETRA or the home exchange of the requested paper). 
 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are seen as possible listings. As „Going Public“ in 
Germany is still a rather rare decision by smaller enterprises, the strategy is usually to offer or arrange 
consultancy services in the preperation of an IPO (Initial Public Offering). As the listing fee depends 
on the size of the emission, SMEs are not really attractive customers for the big exchanges. The range 
of services offered is quite wide, from consultancy to coaching as far as to the formation of business   14
investment companies (together with private capital). The last point mentioned is an example for the 
changing understanding of exchanges as firms competing in the „market of regulated markets“  (see 
section 3). 
Looking at the steps taken by the small exchanges, Stuttgart exchange is considered to be the most 
innovative (FAZ of April 10
th 1999), although the exchanges in Berlin, Duesseldorf and Munich have 
also pioneered some changes. But the new concepts were quickly adopted by the other small 
exchanges and Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse alike. So there is a positive function of the plurality of 
exchanges in accelerating innovation. 
 
The spatial view of most of the small exchanges is explicitly not a regional one. In a number of annual 
reports it is proudly announced, that customers from their home region by now are no longer 
dominant. This attitude of having overcome an archaic phase of development contrasts somehow with 
the introductory remarks by politicians from the respective „land“. These – usually the secretaries of 
the economy - tend to announce equally proud the importance of this very exchange for this very 
„land“ and its economy.  And they claim their political support in order to secure the existence of the 
small exchanges as an important feature of the federalist structure of Germany.  
 
After this overview of strategies and actions of the small German exchanges in general three examples 
will be introduced in detail. The main characteristics of all six remaining exchanges contains Table 2. 
 
-  Berlin Stock Exchange 
Berlin Stock Exchange has developed a unique specialization in foreign securities. More than 10.000 
securities from more than 60 countries are traded on Berlin exchange. This is distinctly more than on 
any other German exchange. But as the average order size in Berlin is much smaller than in XETRA 
or on the Frankfurt floor (Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse), due to the focus on  private investors, the 
share of turnover in foreign securities compared to Frankfurt has declined. For private investors Berlin 
exchange is the leading German exchange in foreign papers, as an Internet survey in 2000 showed. 
This specialization will be strengthened by the projected cooperation with the European branch of US-
based NASDAQ. This implicit merger – joint trade on 200 securities in order to increase liquidity on 
Berlin exchange – will be the first cross-border cooperation of a small German exchange.  
 
-  Hamburg/Hannover Stock Exchange 
Hamburg and Hannover deserve a more intensive look as their merger 1999 has been the first 
deliberate fusion of exchanges in Germany 
iv.  After experiences in cooperation at the Goods 
Exchange Hannover and with a joint computer system in May 1999 the supporting organisations of 
both exchanges decided to merge by forming a new limited company as holding for both stock 
exchanges and the goods exchange. The decision to merge was taken, after both exchanges had   15
experienced severe losses of market share especially after the start of XETRA in 1997. Hamburg and 
Hannover seemed to be badly prepared to face this challenge as they did not have the financial 
background to fully integrate their trade into XETRA on the one hand and as both of them had not 
developed a special profile. When news about the planned merger were made public in spring 1999, 
observers thought that it might have signal function for the overall structure of German exchanges, but 
until spring 2001 their example had not been copied. 
The joint corporation Börsen Aktiengesellschaft (Böag, shares held 50% by each of the former 
supporting organisations) is the only exchange, which puts a focus on the regional economic base of 
their business. The marketing strategy of Böag aims at regional enterprises as potential listings, 
presenting a range of new, mostly high-tech firms in their annual report.  
 
-  Stuttgart Stock Exchange 
Stuttgart Stock Exchange is considered to be the most innovative of the minor German stock 
exchanges, making other small exchanges and even Frankfurt to adopt procedures developed in 
Stuttgart (for example the „Best-Price-Guarantee“ mentioned above) . Starting in 1997, the strategy of 
Stuttgart Stock Exchange has been oriented towards private investors. As the average turnover 
generated by private investors is smaller than that of institutional investors, Stuttgart Stock Exchange 
prefers to use the number of orders, not the total turnover, as significant figure. And comparing the 
orders, Stuttgart ranks second after Frankfurt. This success with private investors is confirmed by the 
results of the already mentioned Internet survey on the quality of German stock exchanges. Stuttgart 
was voted best exchange for private investors.  
Stuttgart is also leading exchange for warrants. As Figure 3 has shown this market segment makes up 
only a very small percentage of all stock exchange turnover in Germany, but  it is the only segment, 
where the share of Frankfurt (floor) is smaller than that of other exchanges. And most of the trade in 
warrants is in Stuttgart. 
Although business in 2001 was – compared to the exceptionally positive year 2000 – marked by heavy 
losses at all exchanges, Stuttgart is still going to invest 20 Million Euro in the improvement of new 
technical systems, making a step towards „technical independence“ from the other exchanges.  
 
These three examples show that aiming at similar target groups is not without risk, especially in a 
market with growing automatization and transparency. Some of the minor exchanges as Berlin and  
Stuttgart have tried to develop special profiles which makes them attractive for customers all over the 
country. This is partly successful as the market share of Stuttgart in warrants and the growing number 
of orders from private investors show. Nevertheless the total market share of the small exchanges has 
decreased in the last years. The dominance of XETRA and the Frankfurt floor in the big market 
segments is still growing. Therefore the specialization strategies are also commented critically by 
insiders. They are convinced that only a joint strategy „against“ Frankfurt – such as the development    16
Table 3: Characteristics of Minor German Exchanges 
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Sources: Annual reports of the Stock Exchanges   17
of a common trading system – will secure a solid position of „retail exchanges“ (Schmitt 2001). But 
this strategy of concerted  action is no realistic option. On the contrary, when Deutsche Börse AG 
went public in 2001, the small exchanges which had formed Deutsche Börse Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
to hold one of the biggest shares, decided to end their cooperation in the Beteiligungsgesellschaft and 
become separate shareholders each (FAZ, June 21
st 2001).  
 
 
6.  Resume: Small German Exchanges: Regional or Retail Exchanges? 
 
Drawing a conclusion from the analysis is easy in one respect: There is only one exchange where the 
role as a specific regional institution is presented as important feature of the exchange´s strategy.  
The remaining five exchanges are – on the contrary – proud of the fact, that the majority of their 
customers is located outside the exchange´s home region.  They are not „regional exchanges“ in the 
sense that they themselves see their base of action on a subnational level. But they are „regional 
exchanges“ in another way, as the government of their „land“ of residence considers the existence of 
an exchange as important. So there is strong political pressure to secure the fragmented structure of 
German exchanges. This pressure is documented, when decisions over financial regulations, which 
have passed the first house of parliament (Bundestag) have to be confirmed in the second house 
(Bundesrat, representation of the federal states). Some decisions had to be changed, because a majority 
of „länder“ voted against the federal government and the government of Hesse, where Frankfurt is 
situated. 
 
The strategies of the small exchanges correspond largely, they all try to occupy business niches, which 
are not interesting for the „global player“ in Frankfurt. Private investors and small and medium sized 
enterprises are the two main target groups of their policy.  
The steps to make business attractive to them are also similar:  
-  reorganisation into limited company, in order to have more flexible forms of governance; 
-  better trading conditions for private investors (trading hours, minimum orders); 
-  guaranteed quality of trade (prices, time) and 
-  consulting for potential listings. 
The characterization as „retail exchanges“ is therefore more adequate than the former „regional 
exchanges“. The two exchanges which have focused on a special – relatively small - market segment 
seem to be more successful than others.  
The small exchanges nevertheless have to face the fact, that their market share is still declining. 
Considering the ongoing consolidation process on the supranational scale, the future for the small 
German exchanges seems to be anything else than secure. From the perspective of countries with a 
more centralist tradition, the German situation seems rather out-of-date, as the comment of a British   18
expert shows. He remarked, that in Britain the regional exchanged had been abolished thirty years ago, 
seeing no reason for more than one stock exchange per country (FASonnZ, May 17
th 1998). 
The struggles between Frankfurt and the small exchanges will go on, for example concerning trade on 
German holidays (pro: Frankfurt, against: small exchanges, Antonoff  2001) or trading hours, which 
are still in discussion.  
But the main competion will still be between the small exchanges. Beeing confronted with declining 
market share will perhaps increase the willingness to cooperate more than before in order to survive. 
Given the recent strategies and the massive political support from the „länder“, this survival will be 
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Notes 
 
i Although Begg talks about urban competitiveness, there seems to be no problem to adapt this scheme for the 
description of a broader scale of subnational, namely regional, structures. 
ii In the case of derivatives – options or financial futures – the issuer is the exchange itself. 
iii DAI Factbook: focuses on share holders and listed firms, does not differentiate between different stock 
exchanges 
Deutsche Börse Factbook: distinguishes between XETRA and Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse, the „rest“ can be 
easily be found as difference from total 
Official turnover statistic: counts twice (sales and purchases), includes interbank transactions 
Orderbook statistic: seems to be the most realistic statistic, as it counts only transactions which have passed the 
orderbook of an exchange, counts only once. 
iv „Deliberate fusion“ pays tribute to the fact that during the national-socialist time there had been forced 
mergers, for example between the exchanges in Frankfurt and Mannheim.  